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Chapter 3 
The Chicago Counter-Revolution and the Sociology of Economic Knowledge 
 
7.1 Introductioni 
7.1.1 Outline of the Essay 
George Stigler and Milton Friedman sought, and achieved, great influence both internally 
(within the economics profession) and externally (over a wider constituency).ii  The intellectual 
and policy transformations that occurred from the late 1960s were the combined product of 
internal forces (apparently impressive historical relationships between money and prices etc.) 
and external anxiety about perceived policy failures (high inflation and rising unemployment 
etc.).  There is, of course, a link between the two (Keynes 1936, 383-4).  Stigler's Theory of 
Price was highly influential both within and outside the economics profession.  When Stigler 
(1969a, 146) testified before the House of Representatives Select Committee on Small Business 
that his "own goal is a competitive economy" (not a goal shared by Edward Chamberliniii), he 
was informed by the General Counsel that "this subcommittee has a long record of being greatly 
infatuated with some of your ideas"; understanding his textbook had cost "many hours of sleep" 
(Potvin 1969, 150, 152).iv 
 
This chapter is concerned with the internal phenomenon.  One model that can be invoked to 
explain this internal phenomenon is the classical process whereby evidence is patiently 
accumulated until the weight of the argument favours one side or another.  Alternatively, 
Stigler's 'model' of the sociology of economic knowledge construction and destruction can be 
used to examine the internal opinion-changing process in the "transition from the overwhelming 
defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964 to the overwhelming victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 - two 
men with essentially the same programme and the same message" (Friedman and Friedman 
1982, viii).  
 
This essay takes the second route and constructs what Stigler (1982a, 92) called a "science of 
science" explanation for the post-war Chicago academic and policy revolution.v  It is inspired by 
Stigler's (1983a, 544) Nobel Lecture - "learning more about how this search for new knowledge 
proceeds is itself a worthy search for new knowledge", and by his reflection that "It is true that 
in policy there is no tenable distinction between education and propaganda" (1967a, 285).  
Section 2 presents an overview of the ‘sociological’ perceptions of both Friedman and Stigler.  
Section 3 describes six aspects of Stigler's 'model' of the sociology of knowledge: the 
overwhelming hegemony of theory in economics (3.1); the crucial importance of internal 
developments as the primary force behind scientific change (3.2); his distinction between the 
elites and the masses in any discipline and the ability of the former to set the professional 
agenda (3.3); the usefulness of the technique of the huckster in popularising economic ideas 
(3.4); and the unpredictable and therefore - to those in an hegemonic position - dangerous 
characteristics of the fox hunts of controversy (3.5).  The sixth characteristic of Stigler's 'model' 
is a description of how to relegate to obscurity notions that might otherwise achieve prominence 
or even dominance (3.6). 
 
The methodology of positive economics instructs researchers to tease out the implications of 
models and theories and to compare these implications with observed behaviour.  Stigler's 
'model' implies that paradigmatic challengers should unleash the unpredictable fox hunts of 
controversy, whilst those in hegemonic positions would be wiser to resist such challenges.  
Chicago macroeconomics was the paradigmatic challenger and Friedman successfully engaged 
his Keynesian opponents in a manner that could only undermine orthodoxy (Johnson 1972; 
Leeson 1998).  Chicago microeconomics had powerful competitors originating from the two 
Cambridges; but "The American Way ... is to rely on competitive private enterprise" (Stigler 
1969b, 1) and Stigler and Friedman declined to provide combustible material which could fuel 
the monopolistic competition revolution.  Section 4 outlines the emergence of what Chamberlin 
described as the "Chicago School of Anti Monopolistic Competition".  Section 5 describes 
Chamberlin's empirical challenge to Chicago (5.1); Stigler's views on the importance of testing 
economic theories and his encouragement of new and difficult research projects (5.2); and 
Stigler's and Friedman's exceptionally brief but firm refusal to engage either Chamberlin or 
Archibald in the kind of microeconomic race that Chicago was successfully initiating at a 
macroeconomic level: "The low point in the fortunes of imperfect competition" (Sutton 1989, 
226) (5.3).  Concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 
 
This essay attempts to impose a framework on Stigler's thought that he would have recognised 
as a fair representation.vi  Two types of (diametrically opposed) readers may mistakenly 
conclude that I am inferring that Stigler and Friedman engaged in some sort of conspiracy (a 
view which Chamberlin came close to expressingvii).  The Chicago counter-revolution 
influenced the Thatcher-Reagan agenda (a topic that is outside the scope of this essay) and its 
opponents feel they were manoeuvred from influence by devious means.  Equally, some 
Chicago economists such as Harry Johnson (1971) and Don Patinkin (1969, 1972) have inferred 
that they detected some Chicago "chicanery" in operation.viii  D. McCloskey (correspondence 2 
June 1997) also observed that "I am one Chicago economist who can attest that George was 
little interested in scientific evidence, though he talked about it a lot - because he knew the 
culture honored it and he wanted to seem a scientist".ix  But other Chicago economists have 
informed me that they regard Stigler as having been driven primarily by the weight of scientific 
evidence and only marginally by the sociological perceptions discussed in this essay.x  Indeed, 
one of "Stigler's Laws" was paraphrased by Harry Johnson (1976, 19) as "the more scientific it 
is, the less sociology helps to understand it".  But it is reasonable to infer that Stigler was 
motivated by a determination to further Chicago-style policies and perceptions (because he 
concluded that these perceptions were well supported by the evidence).  This essay is concerned 
to delineate the sociological influences that Stigler and Friedman brought to bear on their 
economics in general and the monopolistic competition revolution in particular.  What follows 
is based on the assumption that Stigler's stated views on the sociology of economic knowledge 
are a reliable vehicle for such an analysis.     
 
2 Stigler and Friedman 
Stigler was a perceptive amateur sociologist of economic knowledge; he was awarded a Nobel 
Prize for his work on information theory and the functioning of markets, which he regarded as 
his most important contribution (1988b).xi  He also wrote about 'The Direction of Economic 
Research' and the market both for economists and within economics (1991, 1963b, 1967a, 
1982a).  Stigler thought that he had penetrated the veil of "idealistic view[s]" which "misdirects 
attention" but which are "deeply imbedded in professional economic thought.  His 'model' of the 
sociology of economic knowledge was repeated in his Nobel Lecture (1983a, 536, 538, 542) 
and elsewhere; it consisted, among other things, of a human capital explanation of the reason 
why ideas in economics can be either fertile or sterile.  His American Economic Association 
Presidential Address on 'The Economist and the State' began with a discussion of Smith's belief 
in the "efficiency in the system of natural liberty" (1965a, 2), and contained several perceptive 
comments about the sociology of economic knowledge.  These themes recurred throughout his 
career and informed his choice of research topics and (presumably) his method of popularising 
the Chicago message.  His perception was that there were basic similarities between 'Economic 
Competition and Political Competition'; and that political decision makers were endogenous 
participants in the political-economic process (1972a).  Stigler (1987a, 52) "frequently found 
great comfort" in reflecting on the confusion and misinformation that circulated among elites of 
which he disapproved.xii  He (1963c, 109) advocated competition between alternative 
perspectives on the grounds that it was unwise "to give all our baskets to one egghead".  This 
paper employs Stigler's analysis to explore the competition between the Schools of economists 
that sought influence in the postwar period.   
Milton Friedman never devoted as much ink as Stigler did to these sociological themes; but he 
was also a gifted amateur,xiii in addition to being a revolutionary historian (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1963).  He and Stigler were, intellectually and personally, very close: "Mr. Micro and 
Mr. Macro at Chicago" (Becker 1993, 762).xiv  They were also both affiliated with the Mont 
Pelerin Societyxv and the Hoover Institution.  Friedman (1986, 84) acknowledged his general 
intellectual debt to Stigler,xvi and it seems likely that he was influenced by Stigler in at least 
three crucial areas; his methodology of positive economics (section 5.2), running regression 
races between the quantity theory and the Keynesian consumption function (section 5.3) and the 
idea that misinformation in the labour market was responsible for deviations from the natural-
rate of unemployment.xvii  They were part of that extraordinary wave of Nobel Prize winning 
Chicago economists: Friedrich Hayek (1974), Friedman (1976), Theodore Schultz (1979), 
Stigler (1982), Merton Miller (1990), Ronald Coase (1991), Gary Becker (1992), Robert Fogel 
(1993) and Robert Lucas (1995).   
 
Stigler (1988a, 108-9) concluded that "by 1980 there remained scarcely a trace of the two 
Harvard traditions of Chamberlin and Mason in the current work of economics"; but 
monopolistic competition now appears to be fulfilling the promise that Harrod (1934, 470) 
discerned (it is currently central to new trade theory, game theoretic models and the New 
Keynesian revival).  He had previously accepted, in part, the profession's "hopelessly 
exaggerated opinion" concerning the importance of monopoly; but by the end of the 1950s he 
thought that "the doctrine" of monopolistic competition was "exhausted".  It is likely that Stigler 
contributed to this process: his "negativism probably hindered further development ..." (Rosen 
1993, 816).xviii   
 
Hostility to various approaches to economics was not unique to Chicago and to Friedman and 
Stigler.  Keynesians were hostile to the revival of the Quantity Theory, but they failed to 
undermine the revival.  In contrast, the Chicago School were (at least for a while) successfully 
hostile to monopolistic competition, which according to Bishop (1964, 36) had become widely 
accepted and was opposed only by "some determined pockets of resistance".  At an AEA 
symposium on Monopolistic Competition, the postwar Chicago tactics were perceived to have 
been counterproductive to the Chicago cause (Baumol 1964, 44; Bain 1964; Markham 1964; 
Steiner 1964).  These, or similar perceptions, may have persuaded Friedman and Stigler to 
decline the invitation to be drawn into empirical testing.   This paper argues that the tactics of 
this hostility were consistent with Stigler's understanding of the sociology of economic 
knowledge.xix   
 
Stigler argued that "the chief work of economic theorists should for the present still be in the 
theory of perfect competition"; he was also concerned that formalist virtuosity and "a mad 
scramble for originality [by] our younger theorists", had led to a "poor use of the received 
doctrines".  He (1954a, 9; 1939, 481) wrote disparagingly of "the tones of a stuffy formalist"; 
and he sought to "temper [the] over-enthusiastic devotees of the cult of correlations".  An 
"indefinite period" (1955a, 300) could be devoted to the new analytical techniques associated 
with imperfect competition, which had become "almost the dominant concern of economic 
theorists ... a distracting fad".xx  Monopolistic competition lent itself to one branch of the 
formalist revolution (mathematical investigations), and with the advance of computing power, 
Friedman successfully integrated the quantity theory into the other branch (econometrics).  But 
monopolistic competition was denied the momentum that would have resulted from Stigler and 
Friedman accepting the challenge offered by Chamberlin and Archibald.   
 
Stigler warned that "intellectual and political influences are extraordinarily subtle and difficult 
to trace or measure"; "all short answers are wrong".xxi  He (1988c, 9) concluded that Keynes 
sought to be, not a dentist, but "a brain surgeon who operated on ideologies"; and this analogy 
could be applied to Stigler and Friedman who sought to influence the process of knowledge 
construction and destruction.  This essay examines the Chicago counter-revolution as a product 
of their "superior understanding" not so much of the behaviour of economic variables, but of the 
sociology of professional economic knowledge: "our ratio of objective scientific work to policy 
rationalisation is high only in comparison to other social sciences"; "We wish to be scientists ... 
We wish also to be important ... A curious tension" (Stigler 1975, 316-7; 1976a, 352-3).  
Friedman and Stigler spent time discussing the nature of influence and how opinions were to be 
changed (Stigler (1980, 353; 1988c, 11; McCloskey 1994, 341-2).xxii  This paper assumes that 
they behaved as if they were self-conscious counter-revolutionaries.  
 
3.  Stigler's 'model' of the sociology of economic knowledge 
3.1 Theories are trumps 
Stigler  (1957b, 9; 1954b, 103) noted that economists have a tendency to "float on the tide of 
theory".  He reflected that empirical generalisations "fail to achieve the continuity and the 
widespread influence of the formal theories".xxiii  He was also aware that for theorists, 
statistically derived relationships could be "frankensteins over which he has little or no control". 
 Galbraith, for example, looked at the same empirical studies as himself but derived opposite 
inferences (Stigler 1939, 470; 1949a, 96). 
 
With respect to conclusions that contained policy implications, Stigler (1951, 127-8) sought to 
elevate received theory over empirical analysis.xxiv  The reason for this confidence in orthodoxy 
was that it was "our most tested and reliable instrument for relating policies to effects" 
[emphasis added] (1964a, 421).  Received theory, presumably, operated with a considerable 
advantage.xxv  The idea that a new theory "is presumed innocent until shown guilty ... is the 
exact opposite of the presumption I would use" (1982b, 204; 1978, 191). 
 
Not all theorists were to be trusted;xxvi unorthodox approaches were sometimes denied the label 
'theory'.  Galbraith's notion of countervailing power was not a theory but a "dogma" and rested 
on "allegations" of economic life; in the 1930s it would "have attracted no one".  Galbraith's 
policy implications should be "left untouched" because to quarrel with those implications would 
imply "that the theory had reached the stage of relevance to policy ... Galbraith cannot persuade 
us that we should turn our economic problems over to Santa" (1954a, 9-10, 14).  Likewise, 
monopolistic competition had "failed to initiate a fundamentally new direction of economic 
theorising" (1988b, 93).    
 
3.2 The crucial importance of internal developments 
Stigler criticised the attempt to explain how economic ideas gained currency by reference to 
environmental factors; objecting to Wesley Mitchell's downgrading of "intellectual stunt[s] [to] 
a secondary rather than a primary force".  Stigler concluded that the "dominant influence upon 
the working range of economic theorists is the set of internal values and pressures of the 
discipline.  The subjects for study are posed by the unfolding course of scientific developments" 
(1965b [1960], 18, 22, 27-8; see also Sowell 1987, 498).  Friedman found Mitchell's course on 
the history of economic thought "dull" and his view that "theories had no life of their own" to be 
"in sharp contrast to the history of thought as developed many years later by George Stigler".  
Friedman shared Stigler's views about the importance of "the internal logic of the subject ... The 
contrast between Chicago and Columbia was sharp" (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 44).  
 
3.3 The elite and the masses 
It was Stigler's ability to set the agenda (positively and negatively) which underpinned his 
influence among economists (McCann and Perlman 1993, 997); he believed that any assessment 
of a scholar's achievements should include "not only what he wrought but also what he 
prevented" (Stigler 1990a, 12).  Stigler (1969c, 227; 1951, 126; 1982a, 60) clearly distinguished 
between "major scientific entrepreneurs" and the rest, some of whom could only employ "an 
inferior mind", and some of whom were "ersatz economists".  They entered the market as 
demanders, not suppliers, of ideas; and conference participants reminded Stigler (1977, 441) of 
travelling salesman exchanging stale jokes.  He believed that economists were analogous to the 
purchasers of second hand automobiles and he wondered why some ideas "wouldn't run far or 
carry many passengers" (1986 [1982], 134-5, [1979], 340).  Part of the explanation involved a 
quality differential: "which socialist propagandist has been as logically lucid as Friedman?"   
 
Stigler (1978, 201) concluded in his study of 'The Literature of Economics' that two thirds of the 
articles surveyed were virtually worthless.xxvii  There were commonly only about six really first 
class scholars in any field (1963b, 37); a small minority in the profession had "superb instincts" 
with regard to the pursuit of ideas.  The 2 or 3 percent of the profession who were "active and 
ambitious" were also "reform[ers] of economic science" (1988d, 95).  Occasionally, 
"economists-missionaries" successfully ventured into the territory of "apprehensive and hostile 
natives" (1984, 304); but academic consensus (which could be unreliable) was achieved not by a 
professional "plebiscite", but only by an elite group within the profession (1991, 44; 1985, 1).  
Science was defined as the consensus interpretations that emerged from this process.xxviii  In 
contrast, for the "mass" of scholars in any discipline, risk aversion, and a desire to preserve 
already acquired human capital, created a bias in favour of scientific conservatism. 
   
Given this structure of the sociology of economic knowledge, the "most irresistible" of all the 
weapons of scholarship was "infinite repetition"; a "form of the classical Chinese torture" 
(1965b, 4; 1984, 311; 1986 [1979], 339).  Stigler (1965b [1959], 286) was impressed by the 
Fabian Society's "effectiveness in shifting opinion.  If enough able and determined men - and 
the number in the Fabian group was almost unbelievably small - denounce and denounce again 
a deficiency, that deficiency becomes grave".   
 
3.4 The technique of the huckster 
Stigler displayed an understanding of "the technique of the huckster" by which change is 
effected amongst economists.  He believed that intellectuals suffered from "romantic 
wishfulness" in their understanding about influence; a Darwinian "survivor technique" was 
useful: "if I wish to know whether a tiger or a panther is the stronger animal, I put them in the 
same cage and return after a few hours"; "Great economists are those who influence the 
profession as a whole, and this they can do if their doctrines do not involve too great a change 
from the views and the knowledge of the rank and file of the science.  It is simply impossible for 
men to apprehend and to adopt wholly unfamiliar ideas ... New ideas are even harder to sell than 
new products ... One must put on the best face possible and much is possible.  Wares must be 
shouted - the human mind is not a divining rod that quivers over truth.  The techniques of 
persuasion also in the realm of ideas are generally repetition, inflated claims, and 
disproportionate emphases, and they have preceded and accompanied the adoption on a large 
scale of almost every new idea in economic theory ... It is possible by mere skill of presentation 
to create a fad, but a deep and lasting impression on the science will be achieved only if the idea 
meets the more durable standards of the science.  Among these standards is truth, but of course 
it is not the only one" (Stigler 1975, 318-9; 1988b, 99, 108; 1968a, 72-4; 1955b, 294-6).xxix  The 
price mechanism operated here, as elsewhere: "It is perfectly reasonable for individuals to 
purchase intellectual integrity as well as meat and wine - always provided that the price is not 
too high" (Stigler 1988e, 8).   
 
Stigler bemoaned the "attitudes of professional economists ... when economists agree that a 
movement is inevitable, it is not" (1950a, 30, 34).  He argued that the knowledge production 
industry was a competitive industry in which "confused" participants would "watch their 
customers vanish, their best employees migrate, their assets dissipate".  A monopolist was 
"overwhelmingly dominated by forces over which he has negligible control" (1963b, 42).   
 
Stigler clearly had an ability to provoke his audience (Samuelson 1962, 9);xxx as illustrated by 
his Harvard lecture, 'The Politics of Political Economists', on the "mysterious intellectual 
osmosis" that economists are subjected to.  Radicals, he argued, tended to be anti-empirical, but 
scientifically trained economists tended to be politically conservative because of their exposure 
to price theory: "We shall no doubt continue to bend before a strong [anti-conservative] wind, 
but I consider it a remarkable effect of our professional discipline that we shall not be 
contributing to the wind" (1959a, 528-5).xxxi 
 
Later, Stigler (1965b, 48-9) pondered about the role of "fashion" in economics and the "truly 
remarkable" process by which Keynesian economics diverted attention away from more 
traditional research agendas.  He then echoed his Harvard sentiments: economics had become 
highly respectable but was "lacking in promise in basic influence on policy in the future.  I do 
not know whether it is an occasion for pride or for regret that the economist is using Marquis of 
Queensbury arguments in an arena where emotional brass knuckles continue in fashion".   
 
Stigler was impatient with alternative perspectives, and from the late 1970s he "governed" the 
ethics of conversation at Chicago.   Criticisms of his work, even those which appeared in major 
journals, often did not command his attention or respect;xxxii and according to one of his 
Chicago colleagues, exchanges with Stigler were "likely to be terminated by a positivist edict 
and a sneer" (McCloskey 1994, 14).  
 
3.5 The fox hunts of controversy 
Stigler (1978, 200-201, 185) made numerous other perceptive comments about the nature of 
controversy in economics: "if controversy is active almost every proposition seems open to 
debate, and the course of controversy shifts as rapidly as the situs of a fox hunt - indeed, a series 
of simultaneous and intersecting fox hunts".  The fundamentally pervasive concept of 
competition had long been treated with "the kind of casualness with which one treats of the 
intuitively obvious".  But Frank Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, with its comprehensive 
and "meticulous" discussion of perfect competition was counterproductive for the Chicago 
School: it "did most to drive home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously 
defined concept and so prepared the way for the widespread reaction against it in the 1930s".  
Stigler (1956a, 270) reflected on Alfred Marshall's opposition to this ongoing attempt to attach 
"more restrictive" conditions to the concept of competition.  According to Stigler, Marshall's 
opposition was motivated by sociology of knowledge considerations: he sought to avoid 
introducing complications that might lessen the appeal of competition ("He wished to retain for 
competition its traditional claim as the great engine of progress ...").  
 
The "more persuasive" defence of the concept of perfect competition is that it has "defeated its 
newer rivals in the decisive area: the day-to-day work of the economic theorist" (1957b, 1, 11, 
17).  Price theory was scientifically more mature, and therefore stronger, than macroeconomics 
because of the homogeneity of doctoral citation practices - with the exception of the "exclusive 
appeal of monopolistic competition to Harvard" (Stigler and Friedland 1975, 503; 1979).  
"Scientific literature is to a considerable degree controversial literature.  New ideas are sold very 
much the way new automobiles are sold: by exaggerating their superiority over the older models 
... Scientific innovation proceeds more by disparagement of rivals than by excessive self-praise, 
perhaps because it appears more modest.  The role of controversy is indeed to stimulate interest 
and animosity ... The sterility of the early Walrasian system arose because it was ignored by 
most economists and adopted by a few but criticised by almost none.  Milton Friedman's work 
was bound to be spread rapidly in the science and to achieve a wide scope and high rigour 
because of his wondrous gift of eliciting the probing attention of eminent contemporaries" 
(1969c, 222).  Friedman was "a masterful peddler ... intellectuals sell their wares to customers, 
and they - not the customers  - do most of the adapting" (1975, 321, 315).xxxiii  
   
3.6 Neglect - the highway to oblivion 
Chicago has inscribed on the front of its Social Science Research Building an approximation to 
Kelvin's dictum "When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind" (McCloskey 1986, 7; Stigler 1988c, 12).  Knight (1960, 166, n18) thought 
that this statement "very largely means in practice, If you cannot measure, measure anyhow", 
and Viner “rejoined that our knowledge after measurement would still be meagre and 
unsatisfactory” (cited by Stigler 1982c, 23).  Stigler (1992, 462) welcomed "formidable" 
empirical challenges to economists: "Ease of solution ... is not the best guide in the selection of 
agenda for scientific research". 
   
Stigler (1959a, 529) and Friedman were prepared to find proxies for all sorts of variables, 
believing that the empirical economics was the only way to obtain a reliable feel for the way an 
economic system functioned.  The literature of the public utility specialists was defective 
because it had failed to measure the effects of regulation; but Stigler and Friedland (1962, 3, 11) 
were prepared to ask "impertinent" empirical questions to remedy this defect.  Stigler (1965d, 
62-3, 68, 57) reflected on the "truly remarkable ... degree of indolence or lack of curiosity" 
which economists had exhibited by not empirically examining the regulatory experience.  
Economists had "found imperfections, because this is an imperfect world", and they had 
advocated state intervention without investigating the consequences of intervention.  Asking 
new empirical questions could lead to "very striking" results.  Economists had neglected the 
questions that Stigler had formulated: they had "not studied the past".  This neglect had led to 
policy consequences that relied upon an exaggerated respect for the competence of the state and 
a diminished faith in market solutions. 
 But Stigler and Friedman declined to provide fuel for the locomotive of the monopolistic 
competition revolution of which they disapproved.  This decision may have been influenced by 
Stigler's sociological perceptions: "Once an idea is widely accepted, it is guaranteed a measure 
of immortality.  Its decline in popularity is more often due to changing interests than to contrary 
evidence, no matter how powerful that evidence may be ... Even to be demolished is better for 
one's self-esteem than to be ignored: It requires some ability to excite and especially to outrage 
one's fellow professionals ... Neglect is the highway to oblivion" (Stigler 1988a, 67, 75, 112, 
157, 159, 97, 162, 166, 213, 216; Stigler and Kindahl 1973, 721, n6).  Stigler's assault on the 
Giffen paradox was designed to push the discussion of it "deeper into footnotes" (1947b, 156); 
to become boring was a preliminary to the dissipation of professional interest (1962b, 1).xxxiv  
 
Stigler (1978, 200-1) also reflected that the textbooks of a discipline "play a powerfully 
conservative role in the transmission of doctrine ... adverse empirical evidence is not a decisive 
factor ... to understand the rate of decline of a theory".  In 1942, Stigler published half a 
textbook (The Theory of Competitive Price); and four years later he published the full version 
including material on monopolistic competition (The Theory of Price).  This text was 
enormously influential; later imitators tended to be both sequence and content-takers.  Just as 
the "beginning student of physics does not demur at the absence of friction", so the student of 
economics is exposed first of all to perfect competition: "competition is a better single 
assumption, even on the basis of realism, than monopoly" (Stigler 1946, 23).  According to 
Chamberlin (1946, 416), early reviewers objected that the "natural and easy way" would have 
been to begin with the individual firm and monopolistic competition.  Stigler was prompted to 
adopt this sequence because to reverse it would have meant "not merely a reversal of order, but 
a revolution in the author's thinking".  From a pedagogical perspective, perfect competition and 
monopoly possess a simplicity and an accepted theoretical framework that cannot be found in 
the later chapters on oligopoly and monopolistic competition.    
 
Stigler (1949a, 104) was alarmed about the nature of knowledge construction and destruction in 
economics: "ours has become a flabby science".xxxv  Means' theory of administered pricing had 
at first incited a lot of controversy and empirical analysis; later it displayed "growing anaemia; it 
is fair to say that economists abandoned the close study of the subject, less because its lack of 
scientific import was established than because it became boring" (1968a [1962], 235).  The 
ideas of those who found a clash between traditional price theory and observed behaviour often 
had a "Phoenix property"; but "It takes a locomotive of sorts to keep an idea moving in science"; 
"The reworking of predecessors' ideas will seldom lead to very fresh work, and after a while this 
source seems to become boring - at least these economists tend to leave economic theory after a 
while"; "A concept without enemies ... is also a concept without informed friends" (1982a, 52; 
1951, 126).xxxvi  
 
4. The Emergence of the Chicago School of Anti Monopolistic Competition 
Paul Samuelson (1967, 108, n5, 113, 116, 138), reflecting on "Chamberlin's imperishable 
vision", predicted that "reality will falsify many of the important qualitative and quantitative 
predictions of the competitive model ... Chamberlin, Sraffa, Robinson and their contemporaries 
have led economists into a new land from which their critics will never evict us ... Chicago 
economists can shout until they are blue in the face that there is no elegant alternative to the 
theory of perfect competition ... it is significant that Marshall's remaining defenders among 
theorists tend to be those satisfied with perfect competition as an approximation to reality" 
[emphases in text].   
 
In contrast, Stigler (1955b, 301) described the 1930s as exhibiting "an excess of originality".  
His thesis supervisor, Frank Knight, stated that "If there is anything I can't stand it's a Keynesian 
and a believer in monopolistic competition" (Samuelson 1983, 7).xxxvii  But Friedman and 
Stigler did not share Knight's fatalistic despair about the Chicago project for social and 
economic transformation;xxxviii neither did they share his lack of interest in empirical or policy-
orientated economics or his belief in the inherent contradiction between thought and action 
(Stigler 1982a, 167; Buchanan 1991; Kern 1987, 640; Patinkin 1973, 796, 804-5).  Both 
attended his seminars on the sociologist Max Weber; he was their dominant dinner table subject 
of conversation (Wallis 1993, 775).  According to Shils, Knight "offered a great deal to a 
sociologist" (1981, 181, 184; see also Schweitzer 1975).  This sociological perceptiveness 
involved doubt about the outcomes of rational debate: "Frank Knight's First Law of Talk" was 
that "Cheaper talk drives out of circulation that which is less cheap" (Knight, cited by Patinkin 
1973, 807). 
 
In the 1940s, what later became known as the Chicago School faced danger on two fronts.  With 
the loss of Paul Douglas and Henry Schultz, and with Knight's diminished interest in 
economics, there was a shortage of intellectual leaders.  There was also a struggle for academic 
dominance and institutional control at Chicago between the Friedman group and the Cowles 
Commission; a struggle that was resolved in 1955 with the departure of Cowles to Yale (Reder 
1982, 4; 1987, 415).  "The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition" was first 
explicitly defined and described by Chamberlin (1957, 296); only then did economists begin to 
refer to Chicago as a School (Stigler 1988a, 150).xxxix  The modern Chicago School began to 
take shape; culminating in the famous 1960 'Coase versus Pigou' evening at Aaron Director's 
house which was "the most exciting intellectual event" of Stigler's life.  The evening ended up 
with "no votes for Pigou" and effectively partitioned economics into two epochs: A.C. and B.C. 
("Before Coase").  According to Stigler (1983, 221; 1988a, 75, 148-169; 1992, 456; 1972b, 11) 
the previous epoch had confused "all economists ... from at least 1890 until 1961".xl  The 
realisation that Pigou had previously obtained such a "hold", even in places like Chicago, 
generated both enthusiasm and sociological reflectiveness.  It also laid out a detailed research 
agenda for the Chicago School and the Journal of Law and Economics (Coase 1995, 242-4).xli  
The potency of the Coase conversion evening may have been intensified for Stigler given the 
‘mistakenly’ Pigovian role that Coase allocated to the second edition of his Theory of Price 
(1952).xlii   
 
Knight had not provided a Chicago agenda of research (Stigler 1973b, 520); only in the late 
1950s was Friedman able to fully engage his Keynesian opponents.  This was a fight - 
undertaken with strategic considerations in mind  - against the "conditioned reflex[es]" of 
"entrenched Keynesianism" (Friedman 1968, 5, n2).  In 1958, Friedman was joined at Chicago 
by Stigler, who, intellectually, became "more vertically integrated" (Rosen 1993, 814).  Lester 
Telser concluded that "Perhaps what [Stigler] learnt from Friedman was focus".xliii  This 
enhanced focus and the connecting up of the various components of his expertise 
(microeconomics, controversy, and sociology of economic knowledge) produced an 
extraordinarily creative phase, for which he would later be awarded a Nobel Prize (Stigler 
1961b, 1962a).  Harry Johnson's arrival in 1959 also strengthened the Chicago School, which 
was, according to Bhagwati (1977, 225-6) at the time "very Friedmanesque ... The seminars 
seemed to oscillate between proving that elasticities were large with markets therefore stable, 
and formulating competitive hypotheses for apparently imperfectly-competitive industries and 
coming up with high enough R2s.  Econometrics was the handmaiden of ideology: things looked 
imperfect to the naked eye, especially to that of Chamberlin and Joan Robinson, but they were 
'really' not so and the world was 'as if' competitive ... market imperfections were 'demonstrated' 
to be negligible and the imperfections rather of government intervention were the subject of 
active research".xliv   
 
In terms of microeconomic controversy, both Cambridges had powerful alternative theories to 
the Chicago belief that consumers direct the production process (Stigler 1976a, 347).  
Chamberlin (1933) subtitled his book A Reorientation of the Theory of Value, and he devoted 
his career to the proposition that the firm is the essential structural unit of the economy (1957, 
44).  Joan Robinson (1933, v; 1934, 105) attempted to develop Sraffa's "pregnant suggestion" 
that the whole theory of value should be reconstructed around the concept of monopoly, thus 
"emancipating economic analysis from the tyranny of the assumption of perfect competition".  
These were self-consciously revolutionary attempts to construct a general parameter theory 
(Schneider 1967, 144), which could be combined with general equilibrium models (Chamberlin 
1957, 68; Jaffe 1934, 27; Triffin 1940).  Together with Keynes' work, the monopolistic 
competition revolution captivated the economics profession both between the wars and in the 
immediate post-war period (Keynes JMK XXIX [1938], 175-6; Nichol 1934; Galbraith 1948; 
Bain 1948; Bishop 1964).  In the Preface to his seventh edition, Chamberlin (1956) noted that 
his bibliographic supplement had expanded by 806 titles in the eight years since the sixth 
edition.  This was more than the entire period prior to 1948: "important evidence" that 
monopolistic competition was acquiring the mantle of generality. 
 
Traditional economic theory had created a presumption against social interference in the market 
place; but imperfect competition questioned the generally accepted conclusions of economic 
theory (Morrison 1934, 30; Harrod 1934, 463; J. Robinson 1952, 925-6).  Although Chamberlin 
was personally quite conservative, monopolistic competition was associated with the weakening 
of competitive ideology, and its supporters tended to take their stand on a variety of positions 
that were antithetical to Chicago economics (Fellner 1967, 12).xlv  The immediate post-war 
period had witnessed "frequent and heavy bombardment[s]" on monopolistic competition from 
Chicago (Markham 1964, 53).  These tactics were perceived to have been counter-productive to 
the Chicago cause: "It must be emphasised here that even the writings of those who would 
minimise the contribution of monopolistic competition, by their very number and 
vociferousness combine to constitute an encomiast, as it were, praising by strong (and frequent) 
damns" (Baumol 1964, 44). 
 
Economic theory had long accepted the coexistence of perfect and imperfect competition, and 
Stigler (1948, 915) concluded that the latter was "a minor variant" from competition.  According 
to Arnold Harberger, the behaviour of the U.S. manufacturing sector could be accurately 
analysed through the model of perfect competition; the per capita welfare losses associated with 
monopoly amounted to no more than $2 (1954; see also Friedman 1965, 55).  But Machlup 
(1939, 231, 236) concluded that the "increased dose of realism that was won for economic 
theory" by monopolistic competition had led economists to emphasise product differentiation 
and the frequent occurrence of oligopoly.  The new theories had "clear practical value" for 
policy makers.xlvi  These microeconomic disputes were ferociously debated: one of the 
discussants of the Galbraith-Stigler AEA session on 'Fundamental Characteristics of the 
American Economy' concluded that the author of the notion of countervailing power was "one 
of the most effective enemies of both capitalism and democracy" (McCord Wright 1954, 30).   
 
The cultures of Chicago and the two Cambridges appear to leave an indelible imprint on their 
respective students, and on the subject matter of their doctoral dissertations (American 
Economic Review 1960, 864-91).  Colander and Klamer's (1987) survey revealed that only 6 per 
cent of Chicago students thought that price rigidities were very important (compared to 38 per 
cent at Harvard); and 84 per cent of Chicago students (but only 7 per cent of MIT students) 
agreed that inflation was primarily a monetary phenomenon.xlvii  Stigler concluded that 
Friedman's "persistent and skilful use of price theory in dealing with economic questions ... was 
thoroughly drilled into graduate students" at Chicago (cited by Rose Friedman 1977, 24).  
Stigler (1969c, 221) also complained of the "block to proper reading" that MIT students 
exhibited towards Friedman's work; and a student trained using either the 1966 edition of 
Stigler's The Theory of Price, or Friedman's Price Theory (1962) would remain unaware of the 
monopolistic competition revolution, with the exception of a footnote referring to Joan 
Robinson and the effect of price discrimination on output (Stigler 1966, 214, n12).xlviii  
Friedman and Stigler concluded that monopolistic competition "possesses none of the attributes 
that would make it a truly useful general theory ... It is therefore incompetent to deal with a host 
of important problems".  Its contribution has been limited to "enriching the vocabulary available 
for describing industrial experience" (Friedman 1953, 38-9); of which "something like 98 per 
cent of the general [industrial organisation] literature is concerned, explicitly or implicitly with 
the question of monopoly" (Stigler 1959a, 530).  Monopolistic competition appears only in a 
single paragraph (plus the Appendix) in The Organisation of Industry; a paragraph which 
concludes that "It has not been found useful in the analysis of concrete economic problems" 
(Stigler 1968a, 13; in contrast, see Scherer 1970). 
 
Stigler's (1937, 707-8, 710, 713) second appearance in the professional literature, however, was 
an essay on 'A Generalisation of the Theory of Imperfect Competition' in which he suggested a 
framework for research in the "imperfections of competition in agriculture".  The essay 
examined the realism of the assumptions of perfect competition, concluding that one could "add 
much realism" by eliminating some of these assumptions; the non-economic motives for land 
ownership by farmers "seem exceptionally amenable to empirical investigation".  
 
5. Chamberlin and Archibald versus Chicago 
5.1 Chamberlin's Challenge 
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition began as a doctoral dissertation (submitted in 1927) 
and went through eight editions (1933-1962).  According to Stigler (1988a, 96), Chamberlin 
(1899-1967) was "possessed" by his theory.xlix  Alfred Sherrard (1951, 126, 142) thought that 
Chamberlin's contribution had so far proven more "illusory" than revolutionary: "Another wing, 
or perhaps a porch, has been added to economic theory; but the structure retains its original form 
... But as deliberate product differentiation, advertising and salesmanship take the centre of the 
stage, economic theory in the traditional sense must depart.  A revolution in analysis is called 
for - a new set of questions, a new philosophical foundation".  Wallis (1949, 559) suggested that 
monopolistic competition theories should be tested to see how well they could "organise, predict 
or rationalise observed advertising behaviour".   
 
Chamberlin devoted less of his career to the empirical investigation of his favoured market 
structure than to his acute sense of product differentiation; insisting that every Harvard PhD. 
candidate understood the precise differences between imperfect competition and monopolistic 
competition (Johnson and Johnson 1978, 153; see, for example, Chamberlin 1937).l  But in 
Towards a More General Theory of Value, Chamberlin made a case for the revolutionary 
generality of his approach, citing Tinbergen's explanation for the unsatisfactory response of 
economists: "there is a lag of measurement behind theory, which forces the users of applied 
economic theory to stick to the older and simpler theories" (Tinbergen cited by Chamberlin 
1957, 9, n10).  The "right wing orthodoxy" of the Chicago School who "cling desperately to 
perfect competition" could offer only a "jumble of reasons ... a cloud of dust" to defend the 
status quo: "mere tricks to bolster up what is at bottom an emotional position ... surely better 
sticks than this could be found ... people who live in ad hoc houses should be more indulgent" 
(1957, 13-5, 17, 26, 300, 305).  Chamberlin sought to overcome this "heavy" legacy by 
reformulating his theory to assist the process of measurement (1957, 24, 43, 70-91; 1957 
[1948], 226-249).  He (1957, 305-6) concluded that his hypothesis had come into existence 
following the 'classical' scientific process outlined in 'The Methodology of Positive Economics'. 
 He had edited the proceeding of an International Economic Association conference on 
Monopoly and Competition (1954b), contributing an essay on the difficulties of 'Measuring the 
Degree of Monopoly and Competition', which included a suggested classification of the concept 
of monopolistic competition (1954a, 265). 
     
5.2 Stigler and the importance of testing theories 
Stigler (1963c, 109) concluded that economics would have "suffered grievously" had he been 
research 'dictator' in the 1940s.li  Chamberlin (1957, 140, 299) also took an interest in this 
evolution of Stigler's position.  As a graduate student at Chicago, Stigler organised Saturday 
morning seminars on monopolistic competition in the belief that Chamberlin's work would 
revolutionise economics (Wallis 1993).  About one third of the first edition of Stigler's The 
Theory of Pricelii was devoted to a discussion of monopolistic competition (1946, v, 195-302, 
312-4).liii  Referring to "dissatisfaction with the neoclassical theory of competition", Stigler 
complained that economics was in an "unsatisfactory state".  There were, he argued, two 
obstacles before perfect competition could render to monopolistic competition the mantle of 
generality.  The first was variety, that is, the infinite number of conceivable departures from 
perfect competition.  But this was not insurmountable: "it would usually be possible to establish 
sensible classifications which would reduce the problem to much more manageable proportions, 
and in fact this has been done in good part".  The second was "ignorance ... primarily an 
ignorance of relevant assumptions ... the more urgent need is for factual knowledge.  Until this 
knowledge becomes available - and this is a slow, accretionary process - the detailed content of 
the theory of imperfect competition will remain in large degree intuitive" (1946, 197-8, v).  
Stigler (1944, 81) objected to the "formalism" associated with the theory: "Real progress in the 
theory now requires a shift in emphasis from mathematical analysis ... to detailed studies of 
individual market structures".  
 
Friedman dominated the thoughts and practices of the profession as a methodologist, several 
years before his thoughts on money attracted similar attention.  For a decade he was closely 
involved with methodology, planning at one stage to write a book on the subject.  In November 
1947 he informed Stigler that "I have gotten involved for various irrelevant reasons in a number 
of discussions of scientific methodology related to the kind of thing you are talking about"; this 
interest apparently waned after 1957 (Hammond 1991b, 3, 34; Stigler 1994).  His methodology 
of positive economics was formulated as a "reaction" to Robinson and Chamberlin, and a 
"reply" to a series of empirical studies which questioned the relevance of orthodox price theory 
(Moss 1984; Friedman 1993, 770).liv  Keynesian economics and monopolistic competition share 
a common concern for the 'accuracy' of assumptions; the early drafts of his methodological 
essays reveal Friedman's interest in rebutting the assault on microeconomic orthodoxy.lv  
 
Stigler provided one of the first written expositions of this methodology of positive economics 
in a lecture at LSE on 'Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect',lvi concluding that the dispute 
between monopolistic competition and the theory of competition was "a question of fact, and 
must be resolved by empirical tests of the implications of the two theories (a task the supporters 
of the theory of monopolistic competition have not yet undertaken) [emphasis added]" (1949b, 
22-5, 13, 45; 1949a, 102-4).  Stigler (1955c, 13-14) stated that the dispute between full cost 
pricing and imperfect competition must "first be settled ... presumably by recourse to empirical 
tests". 
 
In the preface to the second edition of his textbook, Stigler (1952, v) sought to "emphasize ... 
how the theory is tested by evidence" and to "incite the student to attempt to test parts of the 
theory for himself ... I can assure him that some parts of the theory in this book are 
unquestionably wrong - and I should like to know which they are".  Stigler (1955a, 300) also 
stated that "One can test empirically a crude theory as well as a refined one".  In a scathing 
article, entitled 'Alice in Fundland', Stigler (1967b, 12) ridiculed the "Untrained Minds" of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for lacking "the humility to subject its policies to 
empirical test".  He commended the ongoing examination of "untested hypotheses of which we 
have too many" (1959b, viii).  Later, in his Nobel Lecture (1986 [1982], 147), he reflected that 
such explorations were sometimes little more than tests of the "intellectual fertility" of those 
doing the testing.  In a lecture at Chicago, he also reflected on the difficulties of achieving 
"objective discussion" about empirical work which stirred up strong emotional or moral 
implications; and he had been previously disappointed with the professional response to his 
tests of theories of which he disapproved (1984, 306).  In 1947, he "tested" Sweezy's demand 
theory;lvii but despite his adverse findings, for four decades the kinked demand curve continued 
to attract the attention of a large proportion of prominent economists (Stigler 1978; 1982b).   
 
Joan Robinson (1952, 925-6) reflected on the lineage of Galbraith's American Capitalism: The 
Concept of Countervailing Power: "imperfect competition was essentially a debunking 
movement" which left the defenders of orthodoxy "in an exposed position".  Her primary 
motive for writing about imperfect competition was to demonstrate that wages were not equal to 
the value of the marginal product of labour and that therefore labour was exploited under 
capitalism (Robinson 1969, xii; Bishop 1964, 37).  She was also curious about how Galbraith's 
audience (different from her own) would respond.  Galbraith  (1954, 2) painted an unattractive 
picture of the "men who resist any tampering with the rigidly idealised world of our ancestors ... 
the self-designated protectors of our political morality".lviii  Galbraith emphasised the 
importance of accurate assumptions and offered the prospect of reformulating economics along 
unorthodox lines.lix     
 
Sympathetic reviewers found in Galbraith's book an invigorating questioning of "classic 
premises"; he had "certainly opened a door which will not be closed for a very long time" (Berle 
1953, 81, 84).  The methodology of positive economics emphasised the output, not the input 
side of economic analysis, and in a famous attempt at door closing, Stigler (1954a, 12) "tested" 
Galbraith's notion of countervailing power.lx  He concluded that the tests were "not flattering to 
the dogma"; but Galbraith's star continued to rise.  Indeed, Galbraith was given an additional 
platform by the 1959 Kefauver Senate Hearings on Administered Prices,lxi and immediately 
prior to Archibald's challenge, Rudledge Vining, writing in the American Economic Review, 
reported the response that Joan Robinson was curious about: Galbraith's work had 
"extraordinary public appeal".  Vining (a non-econometric economic statistician) described 
Galbraith's work as outlining an agenda for statisticians: "a call to competent students and 
analysts to direct their attention to the essential descriptive and analytical tasks" (1959, 119).  
 
Stigler (1949b, 23) noted that "the discrepancies between pronouncements and practice are 
notorious in the field of methodology".  But with respect to the testing of hypotheses, "we can 
be reasonably certain of what is right practice ... Occasionally we lack the data necessary to 
carry out the tests but lack the slight imagination necessary to rework the theory so it bears on 
available information and the enormous energy necessary to ferret out the information ... I do 
not wish to condone our impatience with laborious research, and I hope it will soon disappear" 
(1951, 126-7).  Stigler (1943, 532) welcomed Simon Kuznets' pioneering contribution to the 
"new and ... difficult" field of national income measurement.lxii   He also attempted to test 
aspects of public choice theory related to size of legislatures, whilst admitting that his empirical 
analysis was "long on problems and short on solutions" (Stigler 1976b, 31). 
 Qualitative conclusions from the theory of consumer behaviour needed to "tested empirically".  
Although the bridge between empirical demand curves and their theoretical counterparts would 
never be bridged, fruitful progress could still be made by statistically estimating those  curves 
(1939, 472, 476, 481).  During his stay at the NBER, Stigler completed three major empirical 
studies of Domestic Servants in the United States (1947c), Trends in Output and Employment 
(1947d) and Employment and Compensation in Education (1950b).  His own extensive 
empirical work led him to believe that "the classical theory of the market has direct applicability 
to empirical market determinations ... the applications are manageable in both their data 
requirements and their methodology" (Stigler and Sherwin 1985, 584).   
 
For Stigler (1949b, 54) the purpose of economics was to generate predictions:  "The sole test of 
a usefulness of an economic theory is the concordance between its predictions and the 
observable course of events".  He argued that there was never likely to be any evidence for the 
thesis that competition has steadily declined.  It was therefore "an obstacle to clear thinking on 
social policy" which needed to be abandoned.   
 
Stigler and Friedland (1983, 258) concluded that the Berle and Means assault on the 
assumptions of traditional analysis received an "astonishingly uncritical" reception; but 
traditional analysts continued to work in "complete disregard of The Modern Corporation".  
One explanation for the apparent absence of any discernible influence upon traditional 
economic theory may lie in the observation that "the practice of testing economic theories was 
still extremely uncommon in the 1930s.  Certainly no one dreamt of subjecting Chamberlin's 
Monopolistic Competition or Keynes's Treatise to a formal empirical test".  A series of tests 
had, however, been proposed by Chamberlin (1957), Archibald (1961) and Bishop (1964, 41-3). 
 But the Chicago opponents of monopolistic competition declined to be drawn into the testing 
procedures.     
 
5.3 Archibald's Challenge and Chicago's Response 
The LSE Methodology, Measurement and Testing (M2T) Staff Seminar Series not only 'tested' 
the Phillips Curve, but sought to 'test' all economic theory.  Invoking the names of both Popper 
and Friedman (they could have added Stigler), the M2 T prospectus (1957) stated that "we agree 
with Friedman (although we doubt if he accepts the basic Popperian position that you advance 
knowledge through refutation, and must therefore try to refute)" [emphasis in text] (see also 
Klappholz and Agassi 1959, 67-8).  Their faith in the potency of econometric estimation and the 
methodology of positive economics was matched only by Friedman's and Stigler's faith in the 
potency of perfect competition. 
 
Popper did not participate in the M2T meetings, but his student, Josef Agassi, did.  Agassi 
(perceived by the M2T group to be a 'proxy' for Popper's views) and Kurt Klappholtz castigated 
Friedman's dismissal of monopolistic competition; his criticisms rested mainly on "impatient 
methodology and is conservative and discouraging rather than stimulating".  If the theory was 
untestable at that time then Friedman should assist in the process of making it testable 
(Klappholtz and Agassi 1959, 66-9).  Archibald (1959a, 61-2) doubted if the theory of the firm 
had ever been tested.  Friedman, he argued, had not followed the guidelines of his own 
"revolutionary" methodology: "Is it not precisely those hypotheses which are wrapped in the 
cotton wool and authority of 'tradition and folklore' that most urgently require testing ... 
[Friedman's] purport is to encourage complacency and to discourage that sceptical re-
examination of the allegedly obvious that is the prerequisite of progress".  
 
Five months of weekly M2T meetings (February, March 1959, January, October, November 
1961) were taken up on the theme of "Testing Some Theories of the Firm".  The minutes record 
contributions from an impressive array of young economists, including Richard Lipsey and 
Kelvin Lancaster who had recently (1956) made a provocative contribution to welfare 
economics in the form of 'the General Theory of Second Best' which had severely weakened (if 
not completely undermined) the welfare presumption in favour of perfect competition (but see 
Friedman 1965, 51).lxiii  Also present were Chris Archibald, Maurice Peston, Charles Holt, 
Bernard Corry, Lucian Foldes, Thomas Meyer, Josef Agassi, George Borts, Edward Mishan and 
Richard Quandt.  Archibald (18, 22 February, 4 March 1959) was searching for generality: "Our 
analysis applies to all cases".  He objected to the Hall and Hitch Oxford studies on the grounds 
that "Their methodology is bad.  They are not open to independent refutation"; and to Baumol's 
contribution to the theory of the firm on the grounds that "His data is personal to him".  Agassi 
retorted: "Then we can ignore his data".   Archibald (1960, 210, 213) dissected Jerome Stein's 
essay on 'The Predictive Accuracy of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Wages' and found it 
to "lack discriminatory power".  There was, therefore, "not much cause for congratulation or 
confidence" in the marginal productivity approach.  Archibald then proposed a test of the 
marginal productivity approach that would be "the same for perfect and imperfect competition". 
  
 
The M2T economists were evangelical about reconstructing economic theory so as to make it all 
econometrically testable: "There is a small supply of hypotheses and they are probably all wrong 
... The hypothesis must be improved to make sense of the data" (Archibald, 11 February, 4 
March 1959).  This process of creative theoretical destruction appears to have involved a 
deliberate attempt to be fair to those theories that appeared to have been refuted.  Marginal 
productivity, for example, although apparently refuted, could be defended by alibis: "it seems it 
might be worth trying to check these alibis" (Archibald 1960, 213).  Their evangelical zeal to 
generate testable implications was fuelled by Friedman's methodology of positive economics; 
they also sought to apply this method to areas in which Friedman had made seminal 
contributions.lxiv   
 
On 25 January 1961, the M2T economists met to discuss Archibald's paper on "Chamberlin 
versus Chicago".  Borts opened the discussion by asking: "Archibald's objection is that the 
competitive model is false ... What form will new general theory take?"  Lipsey asked "What set 
of observations would refute Chicago?"lxv  Archibald (1961, 21, 2-5, 7) complained that there 
was a glaring inconsistency between the Chicago tendency to "cling" to perfect competition and 
the "'new' or 'Chicago' methodology".  When it came to monopolistic competition, the Chicago 
economists were engineers, not scientists, whose constructions had led them to neglect the 
"enquiring, scientific question[s]".  Archibald outlined an agenda for a wide reaching theoretical 
and empirical investigation: "we require more facts, not for their own sake, but in order to put 
into the theory sufficient content for it to yield significant predictions ... the new methodology 
provides a solution to our difficulties".  Archibald was not an advocate of the theory of 
monopolistic competition, which he found (at the stage it had then reached) to be 
disappointingly empty.lxvi 
 
Stigler (1962e, xvi) defined the "fundamental characteristic" of scholarship as "the discovery of 
relevant questions [rather] than the giving of conclusive answers"; and Archibald was clearly 
attempting to engage the opponents of monopolistic competition by appealing to their own 
method of research: "this justification should commend itself to Chicago methodologists".  
Stigler (1983b, 416) wrote of Jevons being "ridiculed into silence"; and Archibald's twenty 
seven page essay elicited what must be among the shortest replies in the history of economic 
disputation: "there is a real doubt that any communication between Archibald and me is 
possible" (Friedman 1963, 66).  Stigler  (1946, v) had previously referred to the "greater (or at 
least more explicit) empirical content ... [of] the theory of imperfect competition".  But now 
Stigler (1963a, 63) merely applauded Archibald's "attack on Chamberlin", and ridiculed his 
discussion of Chicago as a "detour ... The methodological discussion is a detour on the detour".  
In reply, Archibald (1963, 69) could only repeat his complaint about the methodological 
"inconsistency in Friedman's and Stigler's dismissal of monopolistic competition on apparently 
a priori grounds".  They were, he stated, guilty of "a shocking piece of obscurantism, and an 
indefensible attempt to close discussion".  This response echoed Chamberlin's (1957, 139) 
complaint about the "set of preposterous misinterpretations so standardised that there could be 
no questioning the fact of their common intellectual origins".   
 
The Friedman-Stigler response could be interpreted in theological terms (as the invisible hand is 
sometimes interpreted): in the 'moral' struggle between the malevolent forces of monopoly and 
its nemesis, the virtuous forces of competition, there was no sympathy for the proposition that 
most, if not all, productive agents exhibited a co-habitating mixture of the two.  Certainly, in 
reflecting on 'Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated', Stigler (1957b) used theological 
language: 'The Critics of Private Enterprise' "emphasised the evil tendencies which they 
believed flowed from [the] workings" of competition.  In contrast, "The vitality of the 
competitive concept in its normative role has been remarkable ... That the concept of perfect 
competition has served these various need as well as it has is providential".  The Stigler-
Friedman methodology of positive economics was influenced by the Popperian demarcation line 
between science and non-science; they appeared to be relocating monopolistic competition on 
the non-science side of the demarcation line, whilst emphasising the "providential" location of 
perfect competition on the science side.  For Friedman (1953, 9), "great confidence is attached 
to [a hypothesis] if it has survived many opportunities for contradiction"; perfect competition 
survived the opportunity for contradiction offered by Chamberlin and Archibald.  
 
Stigler did not neglect monopolistic competition with his Chicago students at this time; he 
"eviscerated" the concept and "conduct[ed] a Demolition Derby ... shattering theories with 
gusto".  This training led his students to find only "meaninglessness" from advocates of 
alternative concepts (Sowell 1993, 787).lxvii lxviii  As macroeconomic paradigmatic challengers, 
Friedman and Stigler were only too willing to set up the "fox hunts" of controversy.  Indeed, 
according to Stigler (1962c, 1; 1965a, 16) the statistical evaluation of economic relationships 
was the only distinctive trait of modern economics; in his AEA Presidential Address he 
reiterated that the Keynesian revolution was one of several "minor revisions compared to the 
vast implications of the growing insistence on quantification ... comparable to the displacement 
of archers by canons ... I am convinced that economics is finally at the threshold of its golden 
age - nay, we already have one foot through the door ... the age of quantification is now full 
upon us".  Stigler (1982c, 13, 22-3) repeated this assessment at “the high noon of capitalism … 
This is the age of quantification … An inconvenient a priori argument can always be eroded or 
blunted by challenging its exclusion or inclusion of some assumption, but economists find it 
difficult to resist well-established empirical [emphasis in text] findings”.     
 
Stigler "wore his passion for measurement on his sleeve" (Demsetz 1993, 795);lxix he also noted 
the "unfortunate paradox that the more meaningful a concept is for analytical purposes, the less 
useful it usually is for empirical investigations" (1939, 470).  Stigler (1949a, 103) ran (possibly) 
the first Keynesian-Monetarist statistical race, finding for the latter a correlation coefficient of 
0.904, and for the former, 0.395.  The testing procedure by which alternative ideas won or lost 
status involved "trial by combat" - an art in which Stigler and Friedman were highly skilled; but 
their stated views on statistical trial by combat were rather different from those of their 
opponents (Stigler 1988a, 116; 1988c, 12).lxx 
         
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The 1959 AEA conference program had been drawn up by the AEA President (Arthur Burns) 
and Stigler.  The conference opened with a joint session with the Econometric Society in which 
Samuelson and Solow (1960) outlined the empirical American Phillips Curve trade-off that 
would unwittingly contribute to the Keynesian demise.  The conference ended with a 
sociological paper from Stigler (1965b [1960], 17) which sought to explain the "areas of active 
work and the lines of attack" in the economics profession.  The writing of history requires an 
organising framework: these two implicit 'manifestoes' illuminate much of the succeeding 
quarter of a century.  This paper has specifically examined the Chicago revolution in the light of 
one of these implicit 'manifestos'.  
 
As Chicago revolutionaries, Stigler and Friedman complemented each other, and it is natural to 
seek a partial explanation for the success of the Chicago revolution in their combined talents 
(Friedman 1993, 772; Sowell 1993, 788).  Friedman contributed to the attack on the 'accuracy of 
assumptions' method of the Keynesians and the advocates of monopolistic competition, and also 
to the direct assault on the Keynesian hegemony.  Stigler brought to the partnership a masterful 
understanding of the nature of knowledge construction and destruction in the economics 
profession (and area in which Friedman was a highly perceptive amateur).  This Chicago (but 
Fabian, that is gradualist) intellectual revolution was launched on a profession whose historical 
sub-discipline had been "permanently declining in professional esteem"; "a nearly moribund 
subject in the United States" (Stigler 1988a, 28; 1982a [1972], 85).lxxi  For Stigler (1961b, 213) 
"knowledge is power.  And yet it occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics" 
[emphasis in text].  
 
In his definition of competition, Stigler (1968b, 181) thought that it would be shocking if 
competitors refused to compete.lxxii  But Friedman and Stigler declined to engage in the 
'regression race' over monopolistic competition offered by Chamberlin and Archibald; although 
they had successfully engaged their macroeconomic opponents in such a race.  Economists are 
Free to Choose their research priorities and the current revival of interest in theoretical models 
of monopolistic competition has yet to generate an impressive empirical counterpart.  Besides, 
Chamberlin, Archibald et al. could conceivably have undertaken the 'race' themselves.lxxiii  But 
Stigler (1971, 1974) contributed much to the analysis of asymmetric free or cheap rider 
situations where agents, in the absence of coercion, considered carefully who would appropriate 
the benefits before taking part in joint ventures.lxxiv  Their response to Archibald and 
Chamberlin was the optimal allocation of Chicago energies, whilst constraining the vitality of 
monopolistic competition explanations.  From the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, Testing 
Monetarism and estimating money demand functions became major preoccupations for 
economists (Desai 1981; Laidler 1977; Stein 1982); testing or investigating monopolistic 
competition never qualified for such attention during that period.  Simultaneously, faith in 
competition rose; while faith in Keynesian economics fell.lxxv     
 
The defenders of microeconomic orthodoxy believed that the advocates of monopolistic 
competition had defined terms which "evades the issue, introducing fuzziness and undefinable 
terms into the abstract model where they have no place, and serves only to make the theory 
analytically meaningless" (Friedman 1953, 38).  The defenders of Keynesian macroeconomic 
orthodoxy made similar accusations about the Chicago challengers.  Stigler's understanding of 
the sociology of economic knowledge led him to predict that some commonly accepted theories 
would have a "low vitality" (1949a, 104); a theory could "limp along for a century, collecting 
large pieces of good reasoning, and small chunks of empirical evidence but never achieving 
scientific prosperity"; the academic poverty of a theory could be caused by its concepts having 
"eluded confident measurement" (1968a, 71).  Stigler and Friedman had reasons for not wishing 
to contribute to the process by which some theories (the ones they disapproved of) acquired 
confident measurement. 
 
Stigler (1969c, 227) recognised that a fertile school requires an opposition with which to argue; 
and Stigler and Friedman were supremely skilful in both engaging in - and avoiding - ongoing 
controversy with their policy opponents: "a scholar is an evangelist seeking to convert his 
learned brethren to the new enlightenment he is preaching" (Stigler 1988a, 211).  As 
macroeconomists they were reformers, or revolutionaries; as microeconomists they were 
conservatives: "Unlike the reformers, who seek to convert, the conservatives seek to defeat ... 
the successful conservative must also be an innovator" (Stigler 1975, 320-1).  As the 
paradigmatic challenger, Friedman brilliantly exploited the Keynesian faith in 
macroeconometric estimation; a faith he did not share (Leeson 1998).  But monopolistic 
competition was an upstart that had failed to reconstruct microeconomics around the concept of 
monopoly.  Competition was still "the main dish" (Stigler 1968a, 5); and microeconomic 
revolutionaries still had to overcome the "heavy" legacy of pure competition (Chamberlin 1957, 
140).  Stigler (1965d, 76) commented on the inherently asymmetric nature of this type of 
competition: "If you support the majority view, a cliche is often enough to support the position.  
It is when you are with the minority that a real burden of evidence is put upon your arguments". 
 Despite its revolutionary potential, Stigler (1976a, 347; 1968a [1962], 251) thought that 
monopolistic competition remained a species of "Cambridge eccentricity", which involved 
"irrelevant numbers" and "dark suspicions".  Friedman and Stigler displayed tactical astuteness 
in declining the invitation to participate in the "Chamberlin versus Chicago" competition.lxxvi  
The Chicago counter-revolution was, in part, the product of superior sociological 
perceptiveness. 
 Many Old Keynesians were taken aback by the success of the Chicago revolution of the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Robert Solow (1965, 146) concluded that "I think that most economists feel that 
short-run macroeconomic theory is pretty well in hand ... The basic outlines of the dominant 
theory have not changed in years.  All that is left is the trivial job of filling in the empty boxes, 
and that will not take more than fifty years of concentrated effort at a maximum".  The prospect 
of losing their hegemonic position was not, apparently, taken seriously: "Apres moi, la 
sociologie" (Solow 1967, 119).  But a considerable volume of "sociologie" of economic 
knowledge preceded the successful Chicago intellectual revolution; much of it authored by 
George Stigler.   
 
One of Stigler's obituaries closed with Milton Friedman's assessment of the attitude of his friend 
and collaborator: "let the chips fall where they may, my task is to be objective, accurate and 
interesting" (cited by McCann and Perlman 1993, 1012).  But Stigler was also acutely interested 
in sociological questions (Rosenberg 1993, 841).lxxvii  Combined with this sociological 
perceptiveness was an almost "irrational ... sense of loyalty ... Much of his work centred around 
saving the damsel in distress, neoclassicalism, from her attackers" (Friedland 1993, 780; 
Demsetz 1993, 794; Yordon 1992; Freedman 1995).lxxviii  Chamberlin (1947, 416) complained 
that Stigler possessed a "'faithful until death' attitude towards perfect competition".  Stigler 
(1951, 126) acknowledged this tendency: "The admonition to keep one's mind open and 
skeptical, for example, is fatal".lxxix  In the 1950s, Stigler (1956a, 278-9) concluded that there 
was "no prima facie contradiction of the classical view of the positive relationship between 
competition and progress or, indeed, as much support for the contrary view as the devil usually 
provides for clever heresies".  But by the late 1960s, confidence in the working of competition 
was "at a low level ... [and] the majority of economists have lost much of their faith".  
According to Stigler (1967c, 356, 361) "The only effective challenge to generous opportunism 
is a trenchant ideology, and that is precisely what we no longer have".lxxx  
 
Stigler (1946, 3) opened the first edition of his Theory of Price textbook with the assessment 
that "The important purpose of a scientific law is to permit prediction, and prediction is in turn 
sought because it permits control over phenomena".  Stigler and Friedman also sought influence 
and control over economists' research agenda.  It is worth asking why they were (at least 
temporarily) successful in this regard.  Beneath the veil of economics lie some fascinating 
processes of knowledge construction and destruction that follow laws and tendencies as 
examinable as the laws and tendencies of economic behaviour. 
 NOTES 
 
i.  This paper was planned around 1990, after having read Neil DeMarchi's account of Popper 
and the M2T economists.  Unfortunately, by the time I got round to writing it, George Stigler and 
Chris Archibald were dead, and so I never benefited from their thoughts.   
ii..  Together with W. Allen Wallis, they were the "three musketeers" of the postwar Chicago 
School (Leube 1986, xiii). 
iii..  Chamberlin (1957, 93, 148) wrote that "It is possible that the economy should be made 
'more competitive'; it is also quite possible that it should be made 'more monopolistic'".  He also 
referred to the "fallacious ideal of perfect competition".  
iv.. In 1982, after winning the Nobel prize, Stigler (1988a, 137) held an impromptu press 
conference at the White House and was "removed from the platform in a manner reminiscent of 
vaudeville days" after mentioning the word "depression".  The unemployment associated with 
the monetary disinflation of the early Reagan years had rendered this word "obscene".  Despite 
Stigler's lack of tact or discretion, Robert Barro's (1991) concluded that he acquired an influence 
which "exceeded that of any economist who has spent much time in Washington". 
v..  Stigler (1961a, 330) noted that "the study of how economic theory influences views on 
policy by non-economists is still an essentially unstudied subject". 
vi..  Melvin Reder (correspondence 1 June 1997) is doubtful that this presentation would have 
been successful: "I doubt that he would have owned up to it, even if he had been made aware of 
it.  George was very sceptical of 'big think' in all its forms and very likely would have tried hard 
to puncture such a theory had it been presented to him". 
vii.. Chamberlin (1957, 300) juxtaposed two quotes from Stigler and Friedman (emphasising 
the repetitive use of the word 'meaninglessness') and concluded that "The idea is virtually the 
same, and I am unfortunately unable to identify its origins as between the two writers cited". 
viii..  Johnson arrived at Chicago in 1959, shortly after Stigler's return  According to Shils 
(1977, 87), Johnson found the atmosphere uncongenial and considered leaving shortly after 
arriving.  One of the first articles he published at Chicago was entitled 'The Consumer and 
Madison Avenue'; but the title "epitomizes the pervasive and subtly corrupting influence of the 
hucksters on the American way of life" and had been chosen for him by "a senior professor of 
economics who is presumably more expert than I in the mass marketing of economic wares" 
(1960, 3).   
ix..  McCloskey (correspondence 26 September 1997) also reflected that "I was nearly the last 
student of Chamberlain at Harvard.  It was a strange experience to go from an environment in 
which one sneered at Stigler to one in which one sneered at Chamberlin".  
x. There is evidence in Stigler's writings to support these concerns.  Stigler (1967d), for 
example, in criticising Galbraith's framework as a "poor vehicle to carry us to an understanding 




xi..  "Here was a Chicago theory that didn't even annoy socialists!" (Stigler 1986 [1982], 144). 
xii.. Stigler (1987a, 52) reflected that "a great nation can survive and prosper no matter how 
misinformed its political leaders". 
xiii..  Whilst advising Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, Friedman noted (on leave at 
Columbia) a chink in the Old Keynesian armour: "I was appalled at what I found.  There was an 
unbelievable degree of intellectual homogeneity, of acceptance of a standard set of views 
complete with cliche answers to every objection, of smug self-satisfaction at belonging to an 
ingroup.  The closest similar experience I have ever had was at Cambridge, England, and even 
that was a distant second.  The homogeneity and provincialism of the New York intellectual 
community made them pushovers in discussions about Goldwater's views.  They had cliche 
answers but only to their self-created straw men.  To exaggerate only slightly, they had never 
talked to anyone who really believed, and had thought deeply about, views drastically different 
from their own.  As a result, when they heard real arguments they had no answers, only 
amazement ..." (1974, 16; 1967; see also Stigler 1973a). 
 
xiv..  Rose Friedman (1976a, 30; 1976b, 23) described Stigler as "one of our dearest friends".  It 
was Stigler who persuaded the Friedmans to come to the University of Minnesota in 1945. 
xv..  Friedman was President of the Society during its twenty fifth anniversary and believed that 
it should disband having accomplished its major purpose (Rose Friedman 1976 (9), 26). 
xvi..  "George was and is a delight and a treasure as a friend and as an intellectual influence ... 
Few economists have germinated so many new ideas and so profoundly influenced the course of 
economic research" (Friedman 1986, 84). 
xvii..  Friedman (1976, 235) wrote: "let there be an unanticipated decline in aggregate demand, 
so that employers are willing to hire fewer workers at each real wage rate as perceived by them. 
 Workers searching for jobs will find fewer offers that, on the basis of their unchanged 
anticipations, are attractive enough to compensate them for giving up the search.  The average 
time between jobs will lengthen, and so will recorded unemployment.  As the less attractive 
employment situation becomes more widely known, job-seekers will revise their anticipation 
about opportunities, become less choosy, and recorded unemployment will decline towards its 
natural level".  Stigler's (1962a, 94, 104) 'Information in the Labor Market' is concerned, in large 
part, with the problem of how job seekers "acquire information on the wage rate ... a highly 
rewarding area for future research". 
 
xviii..  Rosen (1993, 813-4) concluded that Stigler's unrelenting opposition to monopolistic 
competition hindered the development of the economics of product differentiation. 
xix..  Keynes did not utilise an imperfect competition framework in the General Theory for 
tactical reasons: he apparently informed Gardiner Means that he "wanted to beat the buggers at 
their own game" (cited by Marris 1992, 1241, n13).  
xx. At least one (recently arrived) Chicago economist concluded that economists were no 
longer "concerned with matters of vital importance to the affluence society"; and had turned 
  
  
away "from intellectual interest into professional competence" as expressed in mathematical 
and econometric techniques (Johnson 1960, 119-120). 
xxi..  Stigler (1970, 426; 1957a, 159; 1982a, vii, 86) cautioned that "biography distorts rather 
than illuminates the understanding of scientific work", although he also thought that Rogin's 
history of economic theory intentionally added little, but unintentionally shed "an illuminating 
light" on a species of American late-New Deal radical thought.  
xxii..  Sherwin Rosen (correspondence, 23 April 1997) recalled that the question of influence 
came up in conversations with Stigler "rather often, but in a rather oblique casual way and not 
particularly in a formal way".  Deirdre McCloskey (correspondence, 2 June 1997) recalled that 
"they were self-conscious counter-revolutionaries.  They talked about it all the time". 
xxiii..  Empirical workers "do not give [their] generalisations the abstract and systematic 
formulation that characterises conventional economic theory.  As a result, the generalisations 
seem closely bound to the specific empirical researches on which they are based, and they lend 
themselves much less to cumulative refinement and elaboration and to widening areas of 
application".  
xxiv..  He argued that "received theory deserves more respect and quantitative materials less 
respect than are commonly accorded them".   
xxv..   "Unless an author explicitly sets out to refute a theory, one should characterise his 
attitude towards that theory as favourable, or at worst neutral, if he actually refers to the theory.  
For he is reviving its currency and advertising its existence" (1978, 196).  
xxvi..  "The theorist is a dangerous person to let loose on economic reform" (1980, 349). 
xxvii.. He stated that "two thirds at a minimum made no positive contribution to received 
knowledge on oligopoly behaviour: they contain neither a new fact nor a new idea [emphasis in 
text]".   Likewise, papers that were critical of Reaganomics contained 94 percent malice and 
about 2 percent knowledge (1988d, 91).  
xxviii.. The "scientific content of a man's work is the content as interpreted by his 
contemporaries" (1990b, 765).  
xxix.. Stigler (1949a, 95) also noted that: "Tactically this is perhaps Lord Keynes's greatest 
contribution: his contributions need not be itemised". 
xxx..  On 12 February 1992, Samuelson wrote to Patinkin (just after Stigler's death): "Often I 
would write a paper really with George Stigler in mind.  Almost never would he vouchsafe a 
reaction.  Still we shall miss him".  Patinkin replied (6 March 1992): "I'm glad that we had the 
same experience with George Stigler.  In my case it was even worse ..." (Patinkin Papers, Duke 
University). 
xxxi.. Whatever Stigler's motives, he succeeded in provoking his audience; Robert Solow 
thought that the contents of his Harvard lecture were "untrue" (1970, 98; see also Coats 1960 
and Rothbard 1960).  Robert Solow (correspondence 23 April 1997) points out that his 
friendship with Stigler transcended any disagreements they had over economics; Stigler was 
  
  
"never an ideologue" (Solow cited by Passell 1991).   
xxxii..  For example, Stigler (1989, 659-660) declined to deal in detail with a "discursive and 
imprecise" History of Political Economy review of his essay on Smith and public choice. 
xxxiii.. "The strong hostility of most intellectuals towards Madison Avenue is possibly due to 
the rivalry between the two groups.  Could the failure of Madison Avenue to reciprocate this 
overt dislike be an instance of the professional's indifference to the amateur?" (1975, 317).   
xxxiv..  Stigler (1988a, 108-9; 1962b, 1; 1964b, 20; 1964c, 83) was only "provoked to attack" 
Means' theory of price determination   - after it became integral to macroeconomic fox hunts of 
controversy via the Kefauver Committee on administered pricing and inflation; and when it 
seemed there may be "No End to Means".  The few remaining economists with an interest in 
administered prices were left "[without] a subject".   
 
xxxv.. "The fact, however, is indisputable that economists generally abandoned a traditional 
doctrine [the quantity theory of money] in important part because of a question of fact which 
they decided by casual observation ... A single contrary observation causes consternation, for the 
whole edifice may tumble - indeed it will tumble if a few prominent economists capitulate".  
xxxvi..   He also reflected that "a formal position" was easier to overcome than an opposition 
that was "inarticulate and unrationalised" (1966b, 278).  
xxxvii..   Knight had a functional, almost tactics-driven approach to economic theory and its 
history: "to contribute to the understanding of how by consensus based upon rational discussion 
we can fashion liberal society in which individual freedom is preserved and a satisfactory 
economic performance achieved" (Stigler 1987b, 57-8).  In an unpublished lecture, Knight 
stated that "truth in society is like strychnine in the individual body, medicinal in special 
conditions and minute doses; otherwise and in general a deadly poison ..." (cited by Stigler 
1987b, 59).   
xxxviii.. Knight advised his students that "You can be with the majority or you can be in the 
right" (Patinkin 1973, 798).  Rose Friedman (1976, 30) who was Knight's research assistant 
(1934-6) recalled that Knight's scepticism "unfortunately discouraged some of his students from 
making the contribution that they might otherwise have made". 
xxxix..  Stigler (1962d, 71) thought the title invited a "slovenly stereotype"; it was also 
geographically inaccurate in that Friedman, he rather provocatively claimed, was the leader of 
the "Berkeley-Cambridge axis". 
xl..  Stigler has been accused of misinterpreting the Coase Theorem; Coase stated this in 
conversation, and hinted at it in his writing (correspondence from McCloskey 3 June 1997; 
McCloskey 1997).  Stigler (1966a, 113) wrote that "the Coase theorem thus asserts that under 
perfect competition private and social costs will be equal ... this procedure obviously leads to 
the correct social results"; it was a "remarkable proposition to us older economists who have 
believed the opposite for a generation".  Coase (1988, 14; 1993, 239-240, 249) migrated to the 
Unites States in 1951, in part because of his admiration for Stigler and Knight.  He 
distinguished between the "Coase Theorem" (with inverted commas) as "formalised by Stigler 
  
  
... It would not seem worthwhile to spend much time investigating the properties of such a 
world", and the Coase Theorem (without inverted commas), a "preliminary to the development 
of an analytical system capable of tackling the problems posed by the real world of transactions 
costs".      
xli..  This agenda (law and economics, the economics of the state, regulation etc) increasingly 
dominated research at Chicago and "George was as much product of this atmosphere as 
producer" (correspondence from Reder, 1 June 1997). 
xlii..   "The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be 
made ... the suggested courses of action are inappropriate" (Coase 1960, 1-2). 
  
xliii..  Referring to "focus", Telser continued: "I believe this is the main lesson I learned from 
Friedman" (correspondence 29 April 1997). 
xliv.. Bhagwati's obituary of Johnson was not well received at Chicago; it was perceived to be 
self-serving and inaccurate (correspondence from McCloskey 2 June 1997).  Friedman 
(correspondence, 5 February 1995) took great exception to aspects of it.  He also recalled that 
"So far as I know, the seminars were never testing imperfect competition yet there is an element 
of truth in what Bhagwati said.  That is that most of the empirical work that was going on was 
undertaken to see whether the simple assumption of competitive hypotheses for apparently 
imperfectly competitive industries led to results that were contradicted or not contradicted by 
the available evidence.  However, that did not arise from any attempt to test imperfect 
competition but, much more fundamentally, to see how you much you could explain by the 
competitive approach and how much was left that would have to be explained by monopoly.  
There were also quite a number of articles during that period which offered explanations relying 
on monopolistic competition positions for many observed phenomena such as retail price fixing, 
tie-in arrangements, and the like".  Lester Telser (correspondence 28 April 1997) also informed 
me of the empirical work on issues raised by monopolistic competition by members of the 
industrial organisation group at Chicago (e.g. Telser 1962a, 1962b and 1971; Demsetz 1962).  
Telser also points out that Stigler's Theory of Price (1966, 32, n18) refers to one of these articles 
(Telser 1962b).   
xlv..  "Chamberlin pointed the way to a revolutionary change in price theory ... The major 
defence of Chamberlin's principal contribution rests on the methodologically sound proposition 
that an economic theory can only be as good as its assumptions ... [the Chicago] stand is 
transparently ludicrous" (Bain 1967, 150-3); Chamberlin provided an "inspiring vision of 
realistic economics" (Kuenne 1967, v); "it has to be recognised that a general abandonment of 
the assumption of perfect competition, a universal adoption of the assumption of monopoly, 
must have very destructive consequences for economic theory" (Hicks 1946, 83).  
Bronfenbrenner (1950, 82-3) offered a "compromise" by attempting to integrate monopolistic 
competition into economic theory "without disturbing the fundamentals of neoclassical 
economic thought". 
xlvi..  Edward Mason, Gardiner Means and others at Harvard pioneered The Market 
Concentration Doctrine (Demsetz 1973) which is associated with the development of industrial 
organisation as a subdivision of economics (Phillips and Stevenson 1974).   
  
  
xlvii..  There is some homogeneity behind these disagreements: only 3 per cent of graduate 
students believed that a successful economist required a thorough knowledge of the economy 
("very important"), and 68 per cent thought it to be unimportant.   
xlviii..  First year graduate students at Columbia would find no reference to Chamberlin or 
Robinson in Gary Becker's (1971) price theory course, outside the reading list (which contains 
twenty references to Friedman and Stigler).  In the recommended reading list for his Economics 
300 A and B (September 1948), Friedman included Robinson (1933, chapter 2) and Chamberlin 
(1933, chapter 3, sections 1, 4, 5 and 6 and chapter 5). 
xlix. One reviewer claimed that he had "unduly idealised" limited competition, just as the 
older generation had previously done with perfect competition (Nichol 1934, 337). 
l..  Chamberlin (1962, 5, n4, 226, n1) was sensitive about timing with respect to the 
reconstruction of value theory.  Sraffa's famous essay was published in 1926; but Chamberlin 
stated that his thesis (submitted on April 1, 1927) was at the time of Sraffa's article "virtually 
complete".  Likewise, Hotelling's 'Stability in Competition' appeared in March 1929, several 
months before Chamberlin's essay on duopoly (November 1929), and Chamberlin felt obliged 
to explain why he had not referred to it. 
li.. Stigler was "deeply impressed by the fact that if any one person had dictated the lines of 
research [in economics] fifty years ago, we would be much behind where we are today.  It is 
worse than that.  If I had this power twenty years ago, our discipline would have suffered 
grievously".   
lii.. His Theory of Competitive Price (1942, v) was written with the intention of including this 
material at a later date. 
liii..  Stigler (1940, 364) complained about monographs which paid no attention to market 
forms "other than perfect competition and simple monopoly". 
liv..  "George and I carried on an intensive correspondence while he was exiled to Brown and 
Columbia.  On perusing the surviving records recently, I was struck by his contribution to my 
methodology article, in the course of exchanges between us about an article that he was writing 
on imperfect competition" (Friedman 1993, 770). 
lv..   The Friedman-Stigler correspondence shows a concern about the struggle for influence: "I 
keep feeling that you arouse skepticism and opposition by stopping where you do ... 
[elaboration] will create sympathy for and receptiveness to your thesis and make the paper much 
more influential" (letters from Stigler to Friedman, cited by Hammond 1991b, 12, 23).  
Friedman's methodology was constructed in opposition to the desire for descriptive 'realism' and 
the 'assumption questioning' tendency of both monopolistic competition and Keynesian 
macroeconomics.  One rhetorical device employed by Friedman (1953, 3) was to invoke the 
authority of Keynes (John Neville, The Scope and Method of Political Economy) in the opening 
sentence of his famous methodological essay.  Ten years earlier, Stigler (1943, 358, n7) noted 
the potential potency of this rhetorical device: "I did not realise how neglected this excellent 
book had become in America until, when I recently referred to it, several friends expressed 
surprise that I did not know Keynes' middle name was Maynard!"    
  
  
lvi..  "A good deal of support for this theory stems from the mistaken demand for 
correspondence between 'reality' and premises".  Chamberlin, a "true revolutionary", and his 
disciples had assigned a "fundamentally mistaken role ... to general theory".  The Walrasian 
theory of general equilibrium had "proven to be relatively uninformative"; formalism, in its 
mathematical guise, "should not be made a puppet of a scientific oligarchy".  This had been the 
"period of the clever gadget and the plausible surmise ... the triumph of statistics over history as 
the source of empirical knowledge", when hasty statistical studies falsely concluded that the 
consumption function was more stable than the velocity of money.  
lvii..  "My appraisal of the theory in 1947 was stimulated more by a growing interest in the 
empirical testing of theories than by the intrinsic interest of the kinked demand curve ... The 
main task of the article was a test of the empirical fruitfulness of the theory". 
lviii..  In 1995, Milton Friedman very kindly invited me to visit him at the Hoover Institution, 
but the day before I arrived he suffered a stroke and he was only able to spend an afternoon with 
me.  While he was in hospital I spoke to a number of his colleagues.  One Senior Fellow 
expressed his admiration for both Friedman and Stigler but was surprised when they both 
walked out of a seminar given by a newly recruited junior economist who had expressed support 
for some aspects of Galbraith's work.  The junior economist was promptly removed from the 
Hoover Institution.  Likewise, Galbraith (1978, 150-1) did not forget his adversaries.  The 
Hoover Institution economists who advocated the "romance" of deregulation were "trying to 
recapture the world of Herbert Hoover - it's a very worthy ideal, intellectual archaeology as it 
were.  Once ageing and righteous scholars of conservative mood dreamt of going to Heaven.  
Now it's to the American Enterprise Institute".  Galbraith (1981, 31) was told that Friedman 
opposed his nomination as AEA President: "he offered as his clinching evidence that Veblen 
had never been president".  Mark Perlman (correspondence 6 June 1997) was present when 
Friedman was chairman of the nomination committee: "Friedman can be a perfect gentleman, 
and he presented [Galbraith's] nomination in good grace.  All present knew what pain it cost 
him, but we all admired his composure".  
lix.. "With the decline of independent marker behaviour - or perhaps more accurately its decay 
as a plausible assumption - a gap has been left in our explanation of the operative mechanics by 
which the economy is governed". 
lx..  Stigler (1943, 357) attributed responsibility for the decline in the prestige of economists to 
Galbraith's Office of Price Administration, where he had briefly been employed (Telser 1996, 
2).  Later, he attributed the "weakened ... status" of economists to their high profile involvement 
in the government apparatus (1967c, 360).  Later still, Stigler (1987a, 56) referred to Galbraith's 
"impressive record for error".  
lxi. Senator Kefauver (1965 [1963], 211-2, 180-1), the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly, suggested that "to give us a new focus for our thinking" a "new 
term" was required; replacing 'private enterprise' with 'collective enterprises' or 'private 
socialism' or 'private economic government'.  Kefauver also noted the availability of a 
"plethora" of government statistics with which to pursue these investigations: "There has been 
something of a tendency to gather statistics which might be valuable in the examination of a 
'controversial' topic" [emphasis in text].  
  
  
lxii..  Stigler (1943, 529) thought that the "chief policy applications" of national income figures 
were made to monetary analyses. 
lxiii..  Friedman (1965, 51) stated that “there is no general theory of the second best.  There is 
the proposition that there may exist a theory of the second best". 
lxiv..  Friedman and John Savage (1948, 282) in their 'Utility Analysis of Choices Involving 
Risk', proposed "a crude empirical test by bringing together a few broad observations"; but 
Archibald (1959b, 437) proposed "a crucial test" which Friedman and Savage had "apparently 
overlooked".      
lxv..  This was comment 20 in Stigler's (1977, 442) Conference Handbook: "What empirical 
findings would contradict your theory?" 
lxvi..  "[S]ignificant implications cannot be obtained without more information than is usually 
assumed or readily available ... When we turn to Chamberlin's defence we again fail to find any 
statement of predictions".  
lxvii..  Sowell was specifically referring to Stigler's ex-Columbia colleague, J.M. Clark's 
concept of workable competition, which Stigler (1964b, 20) regarded as an academic 
employment-creating research agenda.  
lxviii..  Lester Telser (1964, 562, n20, 558) found Archibald's challenge "interesting" but 
deficient with respect to the identification problem; he found little empirical support for an 
inverse association between advertising and competition, "despite some plausible theorising to 
the contrary".   
 
lxix..   Rosenberg (1993, 837) concluded that "no previous scholar had ever examined the 
development of the discipline with anything like the same insistence that intellectual progress 
had to be measured in terms of its ability to generate empirically refutable implications". 
lxx.. Stigler (1988a, 116) wrote: "The computer has made it easy to fish for results.  If the 
statistical analysis doesn't come out 'right' the first or the twentieth time, one can drop a year 
from the data, add a new variable to explain contradictions, take the logarithm of another 
variable, and so on until, lo, the desired answer appears - all in just a few minutes".  
Econometricians were the "most quarrelsome class of economists" (1988c, 12). 
lxxi..  Stigler contributed to this development: in 1972, he successfully proposed that the history 
of thought requirement be dropped at Chicago.  Most other economics departments later 
followed suit (Rosen 1993, 811).  At the same meeting Stigler unsuccessfully proposed that the 
economic history requirement also be dropped (correspondence from McCloskey 2 June 1997). 
lxxii..  "[W]e would be shocked if two teams called off the event".   
lxxiii..  Archibald and Rosenbluth (1975, 588) outlined some of "the implications of an 
analytically tractable definition of a monopolistically competitive group". 
lxxiv..  In another context, Stigler (1943, 357) deplored the constraint that some approaches to 
  
  
economics imposed: "The familiar admonition not to argue over differences in taste leads not 
only to dull conversation but also to bad sociology".  With respect to "the economics of 
scholarly advice ... I have always thought that revealed preference is the only reliable guide to 
what a scholar believes to be fruitful research problems: If he doesn't work on them, he provides 
no reason for us to do so" (Stigler 1981, 76). 
lxxv.. According to the Director of the Hoover Institution (Campbell 1986, x), this renewed 
faith in competition and deregulation was due to Stigler's Copernican-like role.  
lxxvi..  As Reder put it: "Why should Friedman or Stigler have entered into a controversy which 
could, at best, only serve to highlight a possible deficiency of laissez-faire and (in their view) 
exaggerate its importance" (correspondence 1 June 1997). 
lxxvii.. Rosenberg (1993, 841) described some of Stigler's questions as "whether there were 
laws or regularities shaping the growth of knowledge itself ... How does the research agenda of 
any science get to be determined?  ... How do scientists persuade one another?  To put it in its 
boldest possible form: What are the underlying laws governing the evolution of a science?"   
lxxviii..  Stigler (1986 [1981], 333) referred to "my friend, the competitive economy".   
Deviations from neoclassical perspectives produced, in James Meade's work, "bastard demand 
curves" (Stigler 1966c, 479).  During the War, he passionately objected to (finding it "especially 
hard to excuse") a book that remained silent about political questions: "Is the purpose of the 
study of economics the production of impartial pages?  Has the democratic citizen no moral 
responsibility to state and strive for that order of things which he believes is best?" (Stigler 
1943c, 78).  
lxxix..  "Not only do we not know how to teach students how to invent theories, but much of the 
advice is surely wrong.  The admonition to keep one's mind open and sceptical, for example, is 
fatal.  Every useful hypothesis will soon encounter facts that are at least superficially adverse, 
and one must love one's own creations and cling stubbornly to them until the contradictory 
evidence is overwhelming.  On the whole economists fully meet this recommendation". 
lxxx.  Some of his critics found his testing procedures to be defective: "a triumph of ideology 
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